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Abstract This article presents new research on income-based child indicators for
immigrant children from 17 different national backgrounds and children of parents
born in Sweden observed during the 3-year periods 1983–85, 1995–97 and 2008–10.
This research examines mean household income, representation at the top of the
income distribution and relative poverty differ for immigrant children from the corre-
sponding levels among children with native born parents. Most of the analysis is
concentrated on the second generation of immigrant children. It is shown that the
relative position of immigrant children deteriorated between 1983–85 and 1995–97
when the labour market situation of immigrant parents weakened more than among
native born parents. Changes thereafter were more complex. Children born in Sweden
to parents from Denmark, Norway or Germany were as likely as children of native born
parents to be observed at the top of the income distribution in contrast to children of
parents from countries with middle or low human development. Poverty rates among
immigrant children were higher among all categories of immigrant children in 2008–10
than among children of native born parents. These cross origin differences in income-
based child indicators can be attributed to the reasons and qualifications parents had
when they entered Sweden and the number of years since their immigration. A majority
of children living in Sweden that are classified as poor in 2008–10 were immigrant
children of various categories.







1 Department of Social Work, University of Gothenburg, P.O. Box 720, SE 405 30 Gothenburg,
Sweden
2 Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany
1 Introduction
Many countries with high Human Development have received waves of immi-
gration originating from countries with lower Human Development. Such im-
migrants and their children often differ from the non-immigrant population in
appearance, name, religion and language, thus their integration into the new
country has attracted much policy concern. From this follows an interest in
developing and measuring child indicators that make it possible to compare
immigrant and non-immigrant children along several dimensions.1 This article
aims to contribute to the literature on child indicators by reporting new research
on the Swedish case focusing on income-based child indicators. This research
has a time dimension as we study the 3-year periods 1983–85, 1995–97 and
2008–10.2
The Swedish case is interesting as the country has long been well known for
its ambitious welfare programmes, comparably equal distribution of income and
low relative poverty rates. In European comparisons of well-being for the
average child, Sweden ranks higher than a majority of the European states
(Bradshaw and Richardson 2009). However, since the beginning of the 1990s
there have been substantial changes in Swedish society affecting the income
generating process. Rates of unemployment are no longer uniquely low, having
since the 1990s been similar to those observed in many other Northern Euro-
pean countries. From the end of the 1990s to 2007 workers’ real earnings
increased rapidly while the real value of many transfers received by persons of
active work age changed little. Furthermore, changes in the tax code made
taxes less progressive and lowered the tax burden for wage earners but not for
households living on transfers. All those changes contributed to widen the
income gap between full-time workers and others of active work age, making
the distribution of household income less equal. As shown in Table 1 did the
Gini coefficient for disposable income increase from 0.21 for the 3 year
accounting period 1983–85 to 0.29 for the accounting period 2008–10.
Sweden is also known during more recent years for having received a large
inflow of migrants, particularly such coming for political reasons or relatives to
such persons. As a consequence, not fewer than 462 000 persons aged under 18
had some kind of immigrant background, that is, had immigrated themselves or
had at least one parent who had immigrated.3 Immigrant children in 2010 made
up 28 % of all children living in Sweden. This percentage was higher than that
in the Netherlands and France (both 17 %) as well as the United Kingdom
(16 %), was similar to the level in Germany (26 %), but lower than that in
Switzerland (39 %) and Australia (33 %) (Hernandez 2010). The single largest
sub-category of immigrant children in Sweden is those who are born in Sweden
to two foreign-born parents, the second generation. In 2010 they numbered 194
1 Examples of such country overviews are Katz and Redmond (2010) for Australia, Wanner and Fibbi (2010)
for Switzerland, Clauss and Nauck (2010) for Germany, De Valk (2010) for the Netherlands, Mencarini (2010)
for Italy and Crawley (2010) for the United Kingdom.
2 As income for a particular household often changes a fair amount from 1 year to another we use 3-year
periods in our analyses of income based child indicators.
3 Our calculations are based on the microdata presented in Section 4.
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000, or 16 % of all children living in Sweden.4 It is child indicators based on
the income situation in said households that are the focus of this article.
Immigrant children living in Sweden have diverse country backgrounds and
their parents entered Sweden for many different reasons. An increasingly large
proportion of immigrant children in Sweden have a background in countries
that rank low or have middle standing on the Human Development Index,
typically located outside Europe. There are a number of reasons why immi-
grants have difficulties finding employment. The difficulty in finding employ-
ment means that the gap in employment rates between immigrants and non-
immigrants in Sweden has become one of the largest among countries that rank
high on the HDI (Dustman and Frattini 2011; de la Rica et al. 2015).
This article aims to answer the following research question: How and why have
changes in the Swedish labour market and its welfare system together with the changed
country composition of immigrant children led to changed immigrant native gaps in
household income–based child indicators? We present new research for the second
generation of immigrant children from 17 different national backgrounds and for
non-immigrant children. We look at the mean child income, representation at the
top of the income distribution as well as relative poverty. In many countries
researchers typically have to base their studies of income among households with
immigrant children on sample surveys including few or relatively few immigrant
children and often there are problems with non-response in the surveys. However,
as we have been able to work with income information from tax records and
transfers received for all persons registered as living in Sweden we are in these
respects in a better position. From our data we compute mean income, measures of
representation at the top of the income distribution and relative poverty rates for
each of the 17 categories of second generation immigrant children and the
corresponding levels for children with native born parents.
4 Other categories of immigrant children are (according to our data) 84 000 foreign born and 184 000 born in
Sweden having one foreign and one native-born parent. In addition there are 15 000 adopted children of whom
most are foreign born.


















1983–85 3.3 117.3 0.21 0.42
1995–97 9.4 143.4 0.23 0.46
2008–10 7.7 209.2 0.29 0.48
Sources: Unemployment rate from Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_
a&lang=en, and authors’ calculations based on data presented in the text. Prices of 2011
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Several authors have investigated how and why the labour market situation of
immigrants to Sweden has deteriorated during recent years and others poverty among
adult immigrants.5 However, those studies are silent on average income, affluence and
poverty seen from the perspective of immigrant children and natives as well as on how
they have changed. True, there are some previous studies on poverty among immigrant
children in Sweden, but none exist on mean child income or on the representation at the
top of the income distribution.
Certain previous studies of child poverty in Sweden do not focus on the immigrant
aspect. One such example is Mood and Jonsson (2015) who investigated trends in child
poverty and showed that the offspring of immigrants more often experience economic
hardship than those of natives. Another example is Lindquist and Sjögren Lindquist
(2012) who analysed dynamic aspects of child poverty using the LINDA panel (a
register-based longitudinal data set) for the years 1991 to 2004. In a probit analysis on
the risk of being permanently poor, the immigrant status of the parent was found to be
positively related to poverty status. In addition they found that short education and the
risk of being permanently poor were positively related. The work of Galloway et al.
(2015), who for the period 1993 to 2001 compared the development and dynamic
aspects of child poverty in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, is closer to this study. Those
authors reported that immigrant children constituted an increasingly larger proportion
of the poor children in all three Scandinavian countries. They also showed that child
poverty rates are generally high on arrival in the new country and typically decline with
the passing years since immigration. The present study covers a longer period, it deals
with mean child income as well as representation at the top of the income distribution
and it defines 17 countries of origin. Gustafsson and Österberg (2015) studied the same
years as here using the same database but limited their focus to children with parents
born in Turkey and surrounding countries.
The rest of the article is laid out as follows: The next section provides a brief
description of how Swedish macroeconomics and the welfare state have changed since
the beginning of the 1980s. Section 3 describes how immigration to Sweden has
resulted in an increasingly larger and also changed country of origin population of
immigrant children. The child indicators we use are presented in Section 4, which also
describes the data for the study. Section 5 provides results on mean child income for the
17 country of origin categories and children with native born parents referring to the
three periods. Sections 6 and 7 supplements the analysis by providing information,
respectively, on rates of affluence and relative child poverty rates. Finally we summa-
rise and discuss our findings in Section 8.
2 The Changed Swedish Scene
This study covers a period of two and a half decades, or approximately one generation.
Data availability was a motivation for the start period 1983 to 1985 and the end period
2008 to 2010. In order to understand when most of the possible changes had occurred
we chose to include the period 1995 to 1997 in the study, too.
5 For a survey on the labour market situation of adult immigrants see Bengtsson et al. (2005). Obucina (2013)
and Kesler (2014) investigated aspects of adult immigrant poverty in Sweden.
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The years 1983 to 1985 represent the ‘golden days’ of the Swedish welfare state.
Unemployment was at that time experienced by a much lower proportion of the
workforce than in almost all comparable countries, and, as a consequence, it was
relatively easy for recent immigrants to find a first job (see Table 1). Wage dispersions
were small from an international perspective and the income tax system had a rather
redistributive structure. For decades, welfare programmes had been on a trajectory of
expansion in terms of both eligibility criteria and benefit levels. Inequality in the
distribution of income at the household level had for decades been on a downward
path and the Swedish distribution of income had become one of the most equal among
high income countries (see, for example, Smeeding et al. 1990).
However, this description has become increasingly inaccurate. 6 One of the first
changes that occurred in the early 1980s was the centralised wage negotiations between
trade unions and the employer’s confederation that had taken place for decades being
abolished. Thereafter wage inequality started slowly to increase. The income tax system
was reformed in 1990 and 1991 with the purpose of decreasing its distortive conse-
quences. The reform broadened the tax base, reduced progressivity in tax scales and
introduced a separate tax scale for capital income. As a side effect the tax system
became less redistributive. When the world’s economic downturn at the beginning of
the 1990s reached Sweden it had very large consequences. In November 1991 the
Swedish Central Bank was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate. Keeping
inflation, not unemployment, low became the prime economic policy goal. Another
change in the policy regime framework was that Sweden in 1991 applied to become,
and in 1995 became, a member of the European Union. Sweden’s GDP decreased in
each of the years 1991, 1992 and 1993. Many workers left the labour force and
unemployment increased to levels not previously experienced by those in the active
generations. Initially, increased payments of unemployment compensation and reduced
income taxes dampened the consequences of the earnings losses. However, those
mechanisms also contributed to very rapidly increasing public sector deficits that soon
had to be counteracted by tax increases as well as by cuts in public expenditure: The
number of government employees reduced and many benefits became less generous.
Some of the consequences of these huge changes between 1983–85 and 1995–97
are shown in Table 1: The unemployment rate almost tripled, particularly affecting
foreign-born workers, along with school-leavers.7 While it is true that median house-
hold income was 15 % higher in 1995–97 than in 1983–85, the increase was unequally
shared, as indicated by the increase in the Gini coefficient for household disposable
income, which moved from 0.21 to 0.23, or by 0.02 units. Still, this increase is
somewhat smaller than when we compare Ginis computed for household factor
income, which went up from 0.42 to 0.46, or by 0.04 units.8 The somewhat different
changes in the two Ginis indicate that transfers and taxes to some extent dampened
inequality increasing impulses coming from the markets.
From 1994 until 2007 Sweden experienced increased GDP in all years. It was when
the great recession in export-countries hit Sweden in the autumn of 2008 that GDP fell.
6 See the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2002) and references therein for development during the
1990s.
7 See, for example, Edin and Åslund (2001), Gustafsson et al. (2004) and Eriksson (2011).
8 Factor income is defined as income from employment and capital but not including transfer payments and
income taxes.
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The downturn in 2009 was deep, but was quickly followed by a roughly equally large
increase, meaning that the GDP averaged over 2008–10 was similar to the level in
2007. Unlike during the 1980s, real wages grew rapidly during most of the 2000s,
benefiting households with working members. Median household income increased
from 1995–97 to 2008–10 by as much as 46 %, or approximately two times as much as
between 1983–85 and 1995–97 (see Table 1). However, it was not until the end of the
1990s that the employment situation improved, and then it rose only to levels substan-
tially lower than before the rapid increase at the beginning of the 1990s. Although the
levels of many benefits slightly increased at the end of the 1990s, further increases did
not follow during the decade of rising earnings.
One policy goal of the conservative-liberal government that was in office from 2006
to 2014 was to increase the incentives for market work. One measure was to introduce,
in a stepwise manner, earned income tax credits for wage earners while transfer
receivers (including pensioners) did not benefit from those changes. A consequence
of this is that, in some years, wage earners in Sweden pay less income tax than persons
receiving equally large transfer payments. Other policy changes meant tightening
eligibility criteria for various benefits (sickness benefits, unemployment benefits,
disability pension, etc.). The changes in the transfer systems and income tax system
contributed to making the distribution of income in 2008–10 more unequal than in
1995–97.9 Table 1 shows that while the Gini coefficient for factor income increased by
0.02 units from 1995–97 to 2008–10, the Gini coefficient for disposable income
increased from 0.23 to 0.39, that is, by 0.06 units. This means that the redistributive
property of transfers and income taxes had become smaller over time.
The development of household income during the first years of the new century
meant that real income at the lower part of the income distribution grew only slowly
while increases were large in the middle and at the top. Following from this is the fact
that an increasingly larger proportion of the population live in households with income
lower than 60 % of the contemporary median income (a commonly used criterion for
the risk of being poor in EU countries). According to Statistics Sweden, such often used
relative poverty rates stood at 9.9 % in 1995 but had climbed to as high as 17.3 % in
2010. Such a development means that, in international comparisons, Sweden in 2012
no longer stands out as having uniquely low relative poverty rates, see OECD (2015).
3 Immigration to Sweden and the Number of Immigrant Children
During the first decades of the 1900s Sweden was a country with very few foreign-born
inhabitants. However, as a consequence of a large influx of immigrants, the proportion
of foreign-born persons steadily increased from 4.0 % in 1960 to 7.5 % in 1980, 11.3 %
in 2000 and 14.7 % in 2010. Most foreign-born inhabitants arrive as young adults,
many have a foreign-born partner and their children, born in Sweden, make up the
second generation of immigrant children.
Migrants have gone to Sweden for a number of different reasons, including to work,
as refugees and for family reasons. The country of origin has changed considerably. In
9 A reason that still applies is the increased importance of capital incomes, which are concentrated at the top of
the income distribution. See also Björklund and Jäntti (2013) and Fritzell et al. (2014).
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broad terms the immigrant waves have shifted from work migrants originating from
countries like Finland and Yugoslavia arriving mainly during the 1960s and 1970s
towards refugees and their relatives originating from a spectrum of countries: Chile
(during the 1970s and the 80s), countries in the Middle East (from the 1980s onwards),
Bosnia (during the 1990s) and Somalia (since the 1990s). For many years there have
also been substantial migration flows for work reasons or for family reasons from
countries with high HDI like Denmark, Germany and Norway. A particular character-
istic of foreign-born persons from countries with high human development living in
Sweden is that many have a native-born partner, and their children born in Sweden thus
have a mixed background, as can be seen in Fig. 1.
How the migration flows together with how partnership is formed has resulted in an
immigrant child population in Sweden, as is shown in Fig. 1 for 17 countries of
background for the three periods studied.10 The figure is produced based on the data
presented in the next section. The analysis in the following sections of the article
concentrates on the second generation immigrant children with a background in those
17 largest countries of origin. Figure 1 also puts their number into the perspective of
other categories of immigrant children: those who are themselves foreign born (in most
Fig. 1 Number of children with a different foreign background. Source: Authors’ estimates based on data
presented in the text. Countries are ranked after the Human development Index. Abbreviations: NO Norway,
DE Germany, DK Denmark, FI Finland, GRGreece, PL Poland, CL Chile, FY Former Yugoslavia, TRTurkey,
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina, LB Lebanon, IR Iran, SY Syria, IQ Iraq, VN Vietnam, EE Ethiopia and Eritrea,
SO Somalia
10 We have chosen 17 background countries where at least 5 000 children were found in one of the periods of
observation. Should a child have parents born in different foreign countries, for the purpose of this study we
assign it the father’s country of birth. A person born in present-day Bosnia and who entered Sweden when
Yugoslavia existed is classified as born in (former) Yugoslavia. Pay attention to that in our classification does
the citizenship of a person not play a role.
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cases a relatively small category) and children born in Sweden having one foreign-born
parent and the other born in Sweden (a mixed background).
Several observations can be made from Fig. 1. First we can note a substantial change
in country of origin across the years consistent with the description above of the
different migration streams. In 1983–85 Finland was the dominating country of origin,
as more than 100 000 children, approximately the size of one birth cohort of children
living in Sweden, had such a background. Of those, approximately 50 000 were born in
Sweden with both parents having been born in Finland and approximately the same
number were of mixed background. As the children aged, the stream of migration from
Finland dried up and some migrants and their families returned to Finland the number
of immigrant children with a Finnish background fell to fewer than 40 000 in 2008–10.
In 2008–10 the largest country of background among immigrant children in Sweden
was Iraq, with 48 000, of whom 28 000 were born in Sweden to two foreign-born
parents, 18 000 were themselves born in Iraq and not more than 2 000 were of mixed
background. The development towards a more diversified country of background
composition among second generation immigrant children living in Sweden can be
expressed by looking into the number of countries with at least 10 000 children
belonging to the second generation (see Fig. 1). In 1983–85, as in 1995–97, there were
three such countries of background: Finland, Yugoslavia and Turkey. In 2008–10 there
were six: Iraq, Yugoslavia, Iran, Bosnia, Turkey and Somalia, but not Finland.
In some of the later sections of the article we will make comparisons between
children born in Sweden to parents born in Bosnia, Somalia and Turkey. As we will
see, children belonging to those categories were similar in 1995–97 according to mean
average household income. However, thereafter the development was rather different.
A large majority of parents born in Bosnia, most of whom arrived during the first part
of the 1990s, gained a foothold in the Swedish labour market, and the income of the
category improved remarkably rapidly. The corresponding development among the
Somali and Turkish groups was much slower.11
4 Concepts and Their Measurements
Child indicators can cover many aspects of life and be useful for policy-making in
many spheres, and the information can be collected in different ways.12 This article
focuses on household income-based child indicators that are central for making policies
on taxes and transfers. The indicators used here take the disposable income in the
household in which the child lives as the point of departure. To consider the compo-
sition of the household we adjust it by applying an equivalent scale.13 We then assign
this adjusted household income to each person within the household; child as well as
adult. Such an analytic choice is now standard in studies of the distribution of
household income. In order to even out short-term fluctuations in income at the
11 On the labour market situation of adult migrants from Somalia and Turkey during the new millennium see
Bevelander and Dahlstedt (2012). See Ekberg and Ohlsson (2000) for the remarkable rapid labour market
progress among some immigrants from Bosnia.
12 For example in the Swedish setting there are attempts to collect information on various aspects of a child
directly from the child, see Jonsson and Österberg (2010).
13 For details of the equivalence scale see the documentation for the LISA database (Statistics Sweden 2011).
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household level we average household income over a 3-year period at the household
level and carry out the analysis for each of the three periods 1983–85, 1995–97 and
2008–10.14
We use data from Statistics Sweden originating from different registers. It refers to
all persons who are registered as residing in Sweden and thus does not include asylum
seekers as long as they have such status.15 It ought to be noted, too, that our data is not a
sample. For the children (defined as persons aged under 18) and their parents we
obtained information on demographic variables like year of birth, country of birth,
number of years since immigration and place of domicile in Sweden from the popu-
lation register. Information on the level of education of the parents used in the
multivariate analysis originates from the register of education, which includes detailed
administrative records of education completed in Sweden and information on education
received outside Sweden obtained from questionnaires or validated certificates. The
information on disposable income is derived from the income and tax register, which in
turn receives its information from the tax authority and various authorities paying
transfers to the households. Disposable income includes earnings, capital income (for
example, interests and dividends), realised capital gains from selling stocks and real
estate, and public sector transfers (pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits,
parental benefits, et cetera). Disposable income is measured net of income taxes.
5 Mean Child Income Among Second Generation Immigrant Children
from 17 Countries and Native Children
In this section we report on mean income among second generation immigrant children
from 17 countries as well as children having native born parents for the three periods
1983–85, 1995–97 and 2008–10. We are comparing cross-sections, which mean that no
single individual who was classified as a child in 1983–85 is classified as such in 2008–
10. The information is shown in Table 2 where we express the means in constant prices
and, for an immigrant category, as a fraction of the value for the majority. We also
report percentage changes for each of the two sub-periods. We have arranged the
foreign countries in the table after the level of HDI (human development index) as
observed in 2010.16 Several observations can be made from Table 2. First, the gaps in
average child income towards the majority were in 1983–85 rather small for children
with a background in countries with high human development. In contrast, gaps
ranging up to 25 % were observed for immigrant children from countries with low or
middle human development.
However, the development in average income from 1983–85 to 1995–97 differed for
children with native born parents and immigrant children. Mean income among
majority children increased from 114 000 SEK per person and year to 148 000 SEK
in 1995–97, or by 30 % (which is somewhat higher than for the entire population of
14 Only children who could be observed during all 3 years of observation are included; that is, children that are
born or become adults, die or emigrate during the 3-year period of observation are not included.
15 We deleted children from the data with parents born in Denmark living in the county of Skåne with a zero
income. It is most probable that those parents were commuting to a job in Denmark and that their earnings
were not included in the Swedish tax register.
16 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/data.
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Sweden as reported in Table 1). Immigrant children with parents from countries with
high human development experienced lower income growth than majority children,
and as a consequence an income gap appeared. Also, income among immigrants from
countries with low and middle human development grew less rapidly than among
children with native born parents; as a consequence their income gap towards the
majority widened to become more than 30 % among those from Turkey, Lebanon,
Syria and Iraq as for the new categories of Bosnia and Somalia.
Mirroring the change in Sweden’s GDP, mean child income grew more rapidly
during the second sub-period than during the first for all categories of children. For
children with native born parents, the growth was 59 %, or about twice as large as
during the first sub-period (and somewhat larger than for the entire population of
Sweden, as shown in Table 1). The average income of children with both parents
having been born in Finland increased by 54 %, for those with parents born in Turkey
Table 2 Average equivalent disposable income among native children and children from 17 different origins


















































Sweden 113589 148362 235733 100 % 100 % 100 % 31 % 59 %
Norway 115532 132790 216953 102 % 90 % 92 % 15 % 63 %
Germany 118035 135547 212084 104 % 91 % 90 % 15 % 56 %
Denmark 115025 143202 221260 101 % 97 % 94 % 24 % 55 %
Finland 110954 135187 208024 98 % 91 % 88 % 22 % 54 %
Greece 104682 112918 192869 92 % 76 % 82 % 8 % 71 %
Poland 112085 126710 168662 99 % 85 % 72 % 13 % 33 %
Chile 103077 115816 164829 91 % 78 % 70 % 12 % 42 %
Yugoslavia 111165 112081 158419 98 % 76 % 67 % 1 % 41 %
Turkey 94653 98615 146800 83 % 66 % 62 % 4 % 49 %
Bosnia 93211 180836 0 % 63 % 77 % 94 %
Lebanon 85565 94412 138134 75 % 64 % 59 % 10 % 46 %
Iran 91352 108134 173256 80 % 73 % 73 % 18 % 60 %
Syria 94131 93976 134078 83 % 63 % 57 % 0 % 43 %
Iraq 89354 99865 132401 79 % 67 % 56 % 12 % 33 %
Vietnam 93966 108685 149164 83 % 73 % 63 % 16 % 37 %
Etiopia,
Eritrea
100414 106784 154571 88 % 72 % 66 % 6 % 45 %
Somalia 99537 123472 67 % 52 % 24 %
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data presented in the text. Prices of 2011
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by 49 % and for those whose parents were born in Yugoslavia by 41 %. As a
consequence, the income gap towards children with native born parents increased
slightly for those categories as was also the case for ten other categories of immigrant
children. The opposite development took place among not more than four other
categories of immigrant children, most notably the income increase for children with
a background in Bosnia was as high as 94 % and propelled by the fact that many
parents born in Bosnia found a job. Pay also attention to that the immigration stream
from Bosnia was to a large extent concentrated to a short period of time in the 1990s.17
As a consequence, the gap in mean income towards native children decreased from 37
to 23 %. However, such a development did not occur in the categories having parents
born in Turkey or among those having parents born in Somalia.
Aninteresting issue is: Incasewewidentheviewtoalsoobservechildrenborn inSweden
withone foreignbornparent theother parent nativeborn, towhat extent dowe find a similar
picture?TableA1in theAppendixshowsthatmuchof thedescriptionof thesituationamong
second generation children and it’s changes across time also applies to the category of
children with mixed background. However, in many but not all cases is the gap in average
child income somewhat smaller for children with one native born parent and one foreign
born parent compared to children who have two parents from the same foreign country.
Another difference is that for the development from1995–97 to 2008–10 among themixed
categories was somewhat different as the examples of an income growth more rapid than
among native born were as common as examples on the contrary.18
6 Rates of Affluence
The rate of affluence is here defined as the proportion of the category that has
a disposable equivalent income high enough to place the person in the top
decile of the distribution of disposable income among all persons living in
Sweden the same year. With this definition in mind, the proportion of children
with native born parents in the top decile amounted to 5, 5 and 8 %, respec-
tively, for the three periods studied. Figure 2 starts with rates of affluence for
native children and thereafter orders countries according to HDI. There are no
confidence intervals as the proportions are based on computations for all
children living in Sweden, and are not estimates derived from a sample.
We see from Fig. 2 that children with parents born in countries with high HDI –
Norway, Germany and Denmark – were all well represented at the top of the income
distribution, as were the children of native born parents. This applied also during the
first period under study to immigrant children from Poland.19 Another change across
17 But it is worth nothing that the average number of years in the country is comparable for parents to
Somalian and Bosnian children (12.5 years on average in 2010 for the first group and 14.5 years for the
second).
18 It is beyond the scoop of this paper to analyze reasons for the differences in child income between second
generation children and children in mixed families.
19 Most probably the decreased representation of children with Polish background at the top of the distribution
can be attributed to changed composition of Polish immigrants to Sweden. Many Polish immigrants who
arrived to Sweden from the end of the 40s and decades thereafter were refugees or came for family reunion,
many having a longer education. When Poland became a member of EU in 2004 a flow of work migrants with
a more mixed education background arrived in Sweden.
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the years is the increased proportion of Finnish children found among the
affluent. Figure 2 also shows that it is rather unusual for immigrant children
with a background in a country with low or medium human development to be
represented among the affluent in the population living in Sweden, and this is
true for all periods investigated. In many cases the proportions are actually
lower than 1 %. One exception is children from Iran, among whom 2.5 %
belonged to the top in 2008–10.
So, what characterises households in which children have a high probability
of being at the top of the income distribution? In order to investigate this we
specified and estimated logistic regression models in which a position among
the 10 % of persons with the highest income in Sweden is the dependent
variable. We estimated separate models for children of native born parents and
second generation and for each of the periods 1983–85 and 2008–10. Explan-
atory variables measure location (larger Stockholm, larger Göteborg, larger
Malmö, forest counties and other counties), parental education (seven levels),
parent’s age (four categories), number of children in the family, age of the
child, parents’ country of birth as well as parents’ years since immigration (five
or six categories depending on the year). From the estimates we predicted
probabilities for native children and for each of the 17 categories of immigrant
children and reported them in Table 3. That the immigrant families show great
Fig. 2 Representation at the top of the distribution of household equivalent disposable income among
children from 17 different origins and native children 1983–85, 1995–97 and 2008–10 (percent). Source:
Authors’ estimates based on data presented in the text. Countries are ranked after the Human development
Index. Abbreviations: SW Sweden, NO Norway, DE Germany, DK Denmark, FI Finland, GR Greece, PL
Poland, CL Chile, FY Former Yugoslavia, TR Turkey, BA Bosnia and Herzegovina, LB Lebanon, IR Iran, SY
Syria, IQ Iraq, VN Vietnam, EE Ethiopia and Eritrea, SO Somalia
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disparity when it comes to levels of education, region in Sweden and number
of children is apparent when the descriptions, displayed in the appendix, are
studied.
Not surprisingly, Table 3 shows that, it is the level of parental education that
is strongly related to the probability of being at the top of the income distribu-
tion. We also learn that for a given parental level of education, the probability is
typically lower in cases where the parents are foreign born and particularly low
if the parents have only recently immigrated. There are also visible differences in
Table 3 Predicted probability from logistic regression of belonging in the top 10 % for a child with given
characteristics but having parents with different levels of education, country of birth and years since














at least 3 years’
post-secondary
education




SW 37 % 4.4 % 42 % 4.1 %
Years since immigration
>10 0–5 >10 0–5 >10 0–5 >10 0–5
NO 36 % 21 % 4.5 % 2.2 % 33 % 29 % 2.4 % 1.9 %
GE 28 % 16 % 3.2 % 1.5 % 23 % 20 % 1.4 % 1.2 %
DE 45 % 28 % 3.3 % 1.6 % 42 % 37 % 3.3 % 2.7 %
FI 23 % 13 % 2.5 % 1.2 % 29 % 24 % 1.9 % 1.5 %
GR 16 % 8 % 1.6 % 0.8 % 10 % 8 % 0.5 % 0.4 %
PO 26 % 15 % 2.9 % 1.4 % 16 % 14 % 0.9 % 0.8 %
CH 4 % 2 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 7 % 6 % 0.4 % 0.3 %
FY 19 % 10 % 1.9 % 0.9 % 12 % 10 % 0.6 % 0.5 %
TU 15 % 8 % 1.5 % 0.7 % 13 % 10 % 0.7 % 0.6 %
BO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 % 5 % 0.3 % 0.3 %
LE 4 % 2 % 0.4 % 0.2 % 11 % 9 % 0.6 % 0.5 %
IN 4 % 2 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 9 % 8 % 0.5 % 0.4 %
SY n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 % 5 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
IQ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 % 4 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
VI 20 % 11 % 2.1 % 1.0 % 11 % 9 % 0.6 % 0.5 %
EE 8 % 4 % 0.7 % 0.4 % 4 % 4 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
SO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 % 2 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Source: Logistic regressions estimated by the authors. The predictions are based on a child aged 7–10 years
living in a household in Stockholm, consisting of two parents aged 40–49 and one sibling. n.a. not available.
Abbreviations: SW Sweden, NONorway,GEGermany,DEDenmark, FI Finland,GRGreece, PO Poland, CH
Chile, FY Former Yugoslavia, TU Turkey, BO Bosnia, LE Lebanon, IN India, SY Syria, IQ Iraq, VI Vietnam,
EE Ethiopia and Eritrea, SO Somalia
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probabilities between immigrant children whose parents were born in different
countries. Take the example from the period 2008–10 of both parents having at
least 3 years of post-secondary education. In cases where the parents are native
born the predicted probability of the child belonging to the top 10 % of the
population is 42 %. However, if the parents were born in Somalia and have lived
in Sweden for at least 10 years, the corresponding probability is no higher than
2 %; if the parents were born in Bosnia, the predicted probability is not more
than 7 %; and if the parents were born in Turkey then the probability is no
higher than 13 %.20
7 Rates of Poverty
Figure 3 shows the relative poverty rates for children belonging to each of the
17 different countries of origin and natives for the three periods. The figure
starts with rates of poverty for native children and thereafter orders the coun-
tries according to HDI. There are no confidence intervals as the proportions are
based on computations for all children living in Sweden, and these do not
involve estimates from a sample. Following what is now a common practice
when reporting on poverty in member states of the European Union, we define
a child as poor in cases where the household equivalent income in which he or
she lives is lower than 60 % of the median equivalent household income as
observed in the same period in the country. Such a definition means that the
real value of the poverty line moves in tandem with median income in society.
21 In our case the real value of the poverty line increased from 1983–85 to
1995–97, and even more rapidly from 1995–97 to 2008–10.22
Starting with children of native born parents we see that the poverty rate
stood at 13 % in 1983–85, went down to 7 % in 1995–97 and increased up to
10 % in 2008–10. We have thus found that although we assess a household’s
poverty status against a poverty line that increases in real value, poverty among
native children was somewhat lower in 2008–10 than in 1983–85. However, the
development is the opposite among all categories of immigrant children we can
follow over both sub-periods: Child poverty rates were higher in 2008–10 than
in 1983–85. In some cases, for children whose parents were born in countries
with high human development, it means an increase in poverty rates from
levels similar to those among majority children in 1983–85 to rates higher than
those among majority children. For other categories of immigrant children it
20 When we relate the coefficients for the country of background dummies to the index of human development
we find a positive relation for both years. R2 adj = 0.382 in 1995–97 and R
2
adj = 0.798 in 2008–10.
21 The 60 % poverty line for the three periods of income in 2011 prices was (for one person) 117 312 in 1983–
85, 143 408 in 1995–97 and 209 255 in 2008–10. In 2009 did 1 SEK equal 0.094 €.
22 If we had chosen to use a poverty line that represents the same purchasing power (using the consumer price
index) for all years as the one we applied for 1983–85 it would have led to lower poverty rates for all
categories studied here for the period 2008–10. For example, in 2008–10 as few as 1 % of majority children
would have been counted as poor, and the maximum in the same period would have been 11 % (for children
whose parents were born in Syria).
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means a development from poverty rates being higher than among the majority
population to rates being much higher than for the majority population.
Looking in more detail at immigrant children with a background in Bosnia,
Somalia and Turkey we see different developments. Poverty rates for children
with parents from Bosnia more than halved to come down to 18 % in 2008–10.
In contrast the poverty rate among children having parents born in Somalia rose
to 59 % while the poverty rate among children having parents born in Turkey
went up slightly to 42 %. Children whose parents were from Somalia are not the
only one to have very high poverty rates in 2008–10. A majority of children
whose parents were born in Iraq or Lebanon were counted as poor during this
period, and the same was the case for at least two of every five children whose
parents were born in Syria and Vietnam.
What characterises children living in poverty? In order to investigate this we
specified and estimated logistic regression models with the status of being poor
as the dependent variable. Separate models for 1983–85 and 2008–10 were
estimated for immigrant and children with native born parents. Explanatory
variables measure location (larger Stockholm, larger Göteborg, larger Malmö,
forest counties and other counties), parental education (seven levels), parents’
age (four categories), number of children in the family, age of the child, parents’
country of birth as well as parents’ years since immigration (four categories for
1983–85 and five categories for 2008–10 categories). From the estimates we
Fig. 3 Relative poverty rates for children from 17 different origins and native children 1983–85, 1995–97 and
2008–10 (percent). Source: Authors’ estimates based on data presented in the text. Countries are ranked after
the Human development Index. Abbreviations: SW Sweden, NO Norway, DE Germany, DK Denmark, FI
Finland, GR Greece, PL Poland, CL Chile, FY Former Yugoslavia, TR Turkey, BA Bosnia and Herzegovina,
LB Lebanon, IR Iran, SY Syria, IQ Iraq, VN Vietnam, EE Ethiopia and Eritrea, SO Somalia
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predicted probabilities for native children and for each of the 17 categories of
immigrant children and reported them in Table 4.
The predictions reported in Table 4 show that the probability of being poor for
a child was as low as 2 % in 1983–85 as well as in 2008–10 if both parents were
native born and had at least 3 years of post-secondary education. The predicted
probability was considerably higher for parents who had a short education,
particularly in 2008–10 when the probability reached 22 %. 23 How long the
Table 4 Predicted probability from logistic regression of being poor (60 % of median poverty line) for a child
with given characteristics but having parents with different levels of education, country of birth and years since
immigration in 1985–87 and 2008–10 (per cent)
1983–85 2008–10
Both parents have
at least 3 years’
post-secondary
education





at least 3 years’
post-secondary
education




SW 2 % 12 % 2 % 22 %
Years since immigration
>10 0–5 >10 0–5 >10 0–5 >10 0–5
NO 7 % 10 % 14 % 20 % 7 % 22 % 25 % 56 %
GE 7 % 10 % 14 % 20 % 7 % 22 % 25 % 56 %
DE 6 % 9 % 13 % 19 % 9 % 26 % 29 % 61 %
FI 5 % 7 % 10 % 15 % 7 % 23 % 26 % 57 %
GR 6 % 9 % 13 % 19 % 8 % 24 % 27 % 58 %
PO 6 % 9 % 13 % 19 % 10 % 30 % 34 % 66 %
CH 7 % 11 % 3 % 5 % 12 % 33 % 37 % 68 %
FY 5 % 7 % 10 % 15 % 8 % 25 % 29 % 60 %
TU 5 % 7 % 10 % 15 % 15 % 39 % 43 % 74 %
BO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5 % 17 % 20 % 48 %
LE 22 % 30 % 11 % 16 % 17 % 44 % 48 % 77 %
IN 10 % 14 % 20 % 28 % 16 % 41 % 46 % 76 %
SY 4 % 6 % 9 % 14 % 19 % 47 % 52 % 80 %
IQ 8 % 15 % 16 % 23 % 19 % 47 % 52 % 80 %
VI 3 % 4 % 6 % 9 % 12 % 34 % 38 % 69 %
EE 4 % 6 % 9 % 13 % 10 % 29 % 33 % 64 %
SO n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 % 38 % 42 % 73 %
Source: Logistic regressions estimated by the authors. The predictions are based on a child aged 7–10 years
living in a household in Stockholm, consisting of two parents aged 40–49 and one sibling. n.a. not available.
Abbreviations: SW Sweden, NONorway,GEGermany,DEDenmark, FI Finland,GRGreece, PO Poland, CH
Chile, FY Former Yugoslavia, TU Turkey, BO Bosnia, LE Lebanon, IN India, SY Syria, IQ Iraq, VI Vietnam,
EE Ethiopia and Eritrea, SO Somalia
23 It should be understood that the number of majority parents having a short education was considerably
smaller in 2008–10 than in 1983–85.
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parents have lived in Sweden also makes a difference to the predicted probabil-
ities of being poor. The predicted probability of being poor was notably high in
2008–10 if the parents had only primary school education and were newly
arrived. In such cases the predicted poverty probability typically reached above
50 % and in cases of parents born in Syria or Iraq much higher than 50 %. It
is worth noting that children having parents born in Somalia did not stand
out once we controlled for parental characteristics, as these children had
predicted poverty rates that were comparable to those of several other back-
ground countries.24
Before summing up this study in the next section it might be useful to show
the composition of children at the bottom and top of the income distribution in
Sweden by country of background during the three periods under study in
Fig. 4. In the figure we include not only the second generation immigrant
children we have studied above, but also children born abroad, children born in
Sweden with one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent, and adopted
children. We see that in 1983–85 immigrant children were represented at the
top and at the bottom similarly to their presence among the total population of
children in Sweden. Thereafter their representation among the poor increased,
and in 2008–10 immigrant children were in majority of all poor children. In
24 When we relate the coefficients for the country of background dummies to the index of human development




Fig. 4 Composition of children by migration status in the total population, at the top and among the poor
1983–85, 1995–97 and 2008–10
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contrast, immigrant children at the top of the income distribution in 2008–10
were in the minority, similarly to how they were represented in 1983–85.
8 Conclusions
In this article we have studied how immigrant children in Sweden are faring by
analysing income-based child indicators. We have focused on 17 categories of
children themselves born in Sweden to parents who were born in various
countries. By studying the three periods 1983–85, 1995–97 and 2008–10, we
could capture the large changes that took place in many dimensions over this
generation-long period. For example, Sweden changed from a country with low
unemployment to one that in this respect became more similar to other Euro-
pean countries. Over the period income grew more slowly in the lower segment
of the income distribution than in the higher segments and the composition of
the immigrant children population changed drastically. The previously large
population of children with a background in Finland diminished rapidly in
number while instead the number of immigrant children with a background in
distant countries with low or relatively low human development increased. At
the end of the period, children with a background in Iraq were the single
largest category of immigrant children.
We found that in 1983–85 there were very small gaps in mean income
between majority children and children with parents born in high income
countries, while we observed more of an income disadvantage for children
with parents born in a country with low or middle human development.
However, the relative position of immigrant children of all backgrounds weak-
ened from 1983–85 to 1995–97 for second generation immigrant children as
well as for children with one foreign born and one native born parent. This
occurred as the labour market situation of immigrant parents deteriorated more
than among majority parents. During the period 1995–97 to 2008–10 changes
of gaps in average incomes between native children and various categories of
immigrant children shows a more complex picture. Most gaps towards natives
for children with two foreign born parents widened, but not as rapid as during
the first period. In addition among children with one foreign born parent and
one native born parent there were not more examples of increasing gaps as of
the opposite.
This study has also reported a large heterogeneity across 17 different back-
grounds of immigrant children in income-based indicators. To a large extent it
is a variation along the dimension the degree of human development in the
country where the parents were born. We have reported that children born in
Sweden by parents from Denmark, Germany or Norway, all countries with a
high degree of human development, were as likely as majority children to be
observed at the top of the income distribution, which is in contrast to children
of parents from countries with middle or low human development.
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We have also reported that poverty rates of immigrant children in 2008–10,
were much higher among for children with parents born in countries with
middle or low human development. At an extreme a majority of children whose
parents were born in Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia were counted as poor, and the
same was the case for two out of five children with parents born in Turkey,
Syria or Vietnam. However, we also showed that poverty rates changed differ-
ently between 1995–97 and 2008–10 for different categories of children having
parents born in countries with middle and low human development: Poverty
rates among Bosnia children more than halved as increasingly many parents
found a job, poverty rates among Turkish children were roughly constant and
poverty rates among Somali children increased rapidly.
Over the period here studied has child poverty in Sweden become a problem
very much linked to immigrant children. Our results show that a majority of
children living in Sweden that are classified as poor in 2008–10 were immi-
grant children of various categories (foreign born, second generation immi-
grants, or of mixed background).
The high poverty rates among categories of immigrant children should
primarily be seen in the light of the difficulties of their parents finding
employment, which in turn is linked to being newly arrived and having a short
education. The results from the regression models indicate that, to some degree,
cross-country-of-origin differences in income-based child indicators can be
attributed to the reasons and qualifications the parents had when entering
Sweden and the number of years that have elapsed since their immigration.
Finally, one should also understand that social and economic policy in general
has a role for how gaps in child poverty rates between natives and immigrant
children develop. For example child allowances, unemployment benefits and
some other benefits are on average more important component of the family
budget for immigrant families with children than for the naive counterparts. The
value of such benefits did not change as rapidly as earnings from the end of
the 90s to 2008. From this follows that gaps in poverty rates between immi-
grant children and native children would in 2008–10 have been smaller if for
example child allowances had since the beginning of the beginning of the new
Millennium been indexed to wages.
Acknowledgments This research was funded by a grant from the Swedish Research Council for
Health, Working Life and Welfare (FORTE). Previous versions were presented at the 33th General
Conference of the International Association for Research on Income and Wealth, Rotterdam, the
Netherlands, August 2014, and at the conference entitled Utsatt barndom, sårbara familjer och
samhällets insatser, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, March 2015. We thank Veli-Matti
Törmälehto and Stefan Wiklund, respectively, for their useful comments on earlier versions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Gustafsson, T. Österberg
How are Immigrant Children in Sweden Faring?
B. Gustafsson, T. Österberg
How are Immigrant Children in Sweden Faring?
References
Bengtsson, T., Lundh, C., & Scott, K. (2005). From boom to bust: The economic integration of immigrants in
post-war Sweden. In K. F. Zimmermann (Ed.), European migration: What do we know? (Chapter 2).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bevelander, P. & Dahlstedt, I. (2012) Sweden’s population groups originating from developing countries.
Malmö University. Current Themes in IMER Research Series, No. 12. http://dspace.mah.
se/dspace/bitstream/handle/2043/13678/Current%20themes%2012%20MUEP.pdf?sequence=2.
Accessed 29 October 2015.
Björklund, A., & Jäntti, M. (2013). Country case study: Sweden. In S. Jenkins, A. Brandeloni, J.
Micklewright, & B. Nolan (Eds.), The great recession and the distribution of household income
(Chapter 6). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bradshaw, J., & Richardson, D. (2009). An index of child well-being in Europe. Child Indicators Research, 2,
319–351.
Clauss, S., & Nauck, B. (2010). Immigrant and native children in Germany. Child Indicators Research, 3,
477–501.
Crawley, H. (2010). Moving beyond ethnicity: the socio-economic status and living conditions of immigrant
children in the UK. Child Indicators Research, 3, 547–570.
De la Rica, S., Glitz, A., Ortega, F. (2015) Immigration in Europe: Trends, policies, and empirical evidence. In
B. Chiswick & P. Miller (Eds) Handbook of the economics of international migration (Chapter 24).
Amsterdam: North Holland.
De Valk, H. A. (2010). Children of immigrants in the Netherlands: growing up in diversity. Child Indicators
Research, 3, 503–524.
Dustman, C., & Frattini, T. (2011) Immigration: The European experience. Discussion Paper Series 20/11,
Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Department of Economics, University College of
London.
Edin, P.-A., & Åslund, O. (2001) Invandare på 1990-talets arbetsmarknad. In Å. Bergmark (Ed.) Ofärd i
välfärden. Antologi i Kommittén Välfärdsbokslut (SOU 2001:54). Stockholm. http://www.regeringen.
se/sb/d/186/a/2758. Accessed 1 January 2016.









SW NO GE DE FI GR PO CH FY TU BO LE IN SY IQ VI EE SO





B. Gustafsson, T. Österberg
Eriksson, S. (2011) Utrikes födda på den svenska arbetsmarknaden. Bilaga 4 till Långtidsutredningen 2011.
Stockholm: Regeringskansliet. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/15/67/80/4e37a363.pdf. Accessed
4 March 2015.
Fritzell, J., Bacchus Hertzman, J., Bäckman, O., Borg, I., Ferrarini, T., & Nelson, K. (2014). Sweden:
Increasing income inequality and changing social relations. In B. Nolan et al. (Eds.), Changing inequal-
ities and social implications in rich countries: Thirty countries’ experiences (pp. 645–665). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Galloway, T. A., Gustafsson, B., Pedersen, P. J., & Österberg, T. (2015). Immigrant child poverty: the Achilles
heel of the Scandinavian welfare state. Research on Economic Inequality, 23, 185–219.
Gustafsson, B., & Österberg, T. (2015). Awidening immigrant–native gap: Child income and poverty among
immigrants from Turkey and the surrounding region. In I. Sirkeci, B. D. Seker, & A. Caglar (Eds.),
Turkish migration, identity and integration (pp. 45–52). London: Transnational Press.
Gustafsson, B., Hammarsted, M., Zheng, J. (2004). Invandrares arbetsmarknadssituation – översikt och nya
siffror. In J. Ekberg (Ed.) Egenförsörjning eller bidragsförsörjning? Invandrarna, arbetsmarknaden och
välfärdsstaten: Rapport från Integrationspolitiska maktutredningen (SOU 2004:21). Stockholm.
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/13180. Accessed 1 January 2016.
Hernandez, D. (2010). International comparable indicators for children of immigrants. Child Indicators
Research, 3, 409–411.
Jonsson, J. O., & Österberg, V. (2010). Studying young people’s level of living: the Swedish child-LNU. Child
Indicators Research, 3, 47–64.
Katz, I., & Redmond, G. (2010). Review of the circumstances among children in immigrant families in
Australia. Child Indicators Research, 3, 439–458.
Kesler, C. (2014). Welfare states and immigrant poverty: Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in
comparative perspective. Acta Sociologica, 58(1), 39–61.
Lindquist, M. J., & Sjögren Lindquist, G. J. (2012). The dynamics of child poverty in Sweden. Journal of
Population Economics, 49, 118–143.
Mencarini, L. (2010). A portrait of children in immigrant families in Italy. Child Indicators Research, 3, 525–
545.
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2002)Welfare in Sweden: The balance sheet for the 1990s, Stockholm
(Series Ds), 32.
Mood, C., & Jonsson, J. O. (2015) Trends in child poverty in Sweden: Parental and child reports. Child
Indicators Research, First Online 23 September 2015, 1–30
Obucina, O. (2013). Paths into and out of poverty among immigrants in Sweden. Acta Sociologica, 57(1), 5–
23.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2015) CO 2.2. Child poverty. available at
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/CO_2_2_Child_Poverty.pdf Accessed 20160216.
Smeeding, T., O’Higgins, M., Rainwater, L. (1990) Poverty, inequality and income distribution in compar-
ative perspectives. The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Statistics Sweden (2011) Longitudinell integrationsdatabas för Sjukförsäkrings – och Arbetsmarknadsstudier
(LISA) 1990–2009 (Integrated database for labour market research). Background Facts, Labour and
Education Statistics Series, 4. Örebro.
Wanner, P., & Fibbi, R. (2010). Children in immigrant families in Switzerland: family and socioeconomic
environment. Child Indicators Research, 3, 459–476.
How are Immigrant Children in Sweden Faring?
